H.M. King Abdullah II of Jordan spearheaded the move to celebrate World Interfaith Harmony Week. The celebration, eventually adopted by the United Nations, is based on the pioneering work of The Common Word Initiative, which started in 2007. Muslim and Christian leaders are urged to engage in a dialogue based on two common fundamental religious Commandments: Love of God and Love of Neighbor; without having to compromise their basic religious tenets.

PCID has organized the celebration for the past four years, and has encouraged other organizations to hold similar interfaith dialogues with members of the different major religious sectors in the country.

This year, PCID organized interfaith dialogues in four cities across the Philippines – Quezon City, Cebu City, Iligan City, and Zamboanga City. The simultaneous conduct of the dialogues have a broader and farther-reaching impact in promoting peaceful co-existence and mutual respect between Muslims and non Muslims.

The success of the Interfaith Dialogue was due to the spirit of openness, cooperation and compassion of the various leaders of the various religious faiths who actively supported the event. PCID is calling on its partners and supporters to develop more innovative and enriching activities to commemorate the World Interfaith Harmony Week in the years to come.

The prime mover of A Common Word Initiative, a ground-breaking interfaith dialogue vehicle from the Muslim World, is Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad of Jordan.

The distinguished panel of judges included H.R.H. Princess Areej Ghazi; H.B. Patriarch Theophilus III – Patriarch of the Holy City, Palestine and Jordan; H.E. Bishop Munib Yunan – Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Jordan and the Holy Land and President of the World Federation of Evangelical Lutheran Churches; Father Nabil Haddad – Founder and Executive Director of the Jordanian Interfaith Coexistence Research Centre; Dr. Minwer Al-Mheid – Director of the Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought; Mr. Nabil Al-Sahib – First Deputy of the Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought; Mr. Aftab Ahmed – Office Director of the Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre.

First Prize Winner: $25,000 Grand Prize and a gold medal will be awarded to the Interfaith Mediation Centre, Kaduna for their event ‘Imam and Pastor from Vengeance to Forgiveness’ in Nigeria

Second Prize Winner: $15,000 Prize and a silver medal will be awarded to the Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy for their event ‘A Common Word Towards A Common Peace’ in the Philippines

Third Prize Winner: $5,000 prize and a bronze medal will be awarded to the Department of National Unity and Integration for their event ‘World Interfaith Harmony Week Malaysia 2013’ in Malaysia

According to the announcement, “In judging, the judges were mindful particularly of those who had the courage to hold events in areas marked by recent interfaith tension or conflicts. They took into consideration efforts made despite scantiness of resources, but also took into consideration the excellence of efforts. They further took into consideration whether events were consistent with the text of the U.N. Resolution establishing the Prize”

PCID organized simultaneous interfaith dialogues focusing on the message of A Common Word, conducted in 4 Philippine cities.

In the National Capital Region, the event was held at the PCID Conference Room, NCPAG Annex Building Conference Room, University of the Philippines, Quezon City.  In Zamboanga City, it was held at the Women Support Center, RT Lim Boulevard, Zamboanga City, In Cebu City, at National Commission on Muslim Filipino (NCMF) Office, Cebu City.  In Iligan City, at Mahad Al-Nur Al-Islamiya, Ceanuri Village, Camague, Iligan City.

Surprised and joyful, PCID President Amina Rasul said she was contacted by the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought on March 17 while she was spending a family day in Tagaytay.  “The announcement was a truly pleasant surprise amidst these weeks of sorrow and tensions”, she said.

She said that PCID worked very closely with the Noorus Salam to implement the event.  PCID has been providing capacity building for the Noorus Salam, an organization of Muslim women religious teachers and civil society leaders.  One of their shared advocacies is to propagate the meaning of A Common Word and the true relevance of interfaith harmony to attaining peace.   PCID was supported by the Magbassa Kita Foundation Inc (MKFI), a Foundation that promotes literacy as the vehicle for peace and development in Muslim Mindanao.

Judges received 64 applications for the prize from the 363 events held worldwide.

The TransCom will be chaired by MILF peace panel chair Mohagher Iqbal. The seven (7) members representing government are Akmad A. Sakkam,  Johaira C. Wahab, Talib A. Benito, Asani S. Tammang, Pedrito A. Eisma, Froilyn T. Mendoza and Fatmawati T. Salapuddin. The members representing the MILF are Iqbal, Maulana Alonto,  Abdullah Camlian, Ibrahim D. Ali,  Raissa H. Jajurie,  Melanio U. Ulama,  Hussein P. Munoz and Said M. Shiek.

PCID congratulates the Government and the MILF for ensuring the representation of women, thru Wahab, Mendoza and Salapuddin (GPH) and Jajurie (MILF).  We also applaud the representation for the Indigenous peoples thru Mendoza from the GPH and Ulama from the MILF.

PCID notes, however, that Tawi-Tawi has no official representation in the TransCom considering that the domain of the New Political Entity will be the Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi, it is unfortunate that Tawi-Tawi has no representation.

Tawi-Tawi leader Ismael Abubakar, Jr, former Speaker of the ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly, noted that while the members of the Transtion Commission are “qualified in terms of education competence and experience”,  he regrets that Tawi-Tawi which had “played an active role in the struggle and in the history of autonomy were left out without any representation”.

It is however hoped that genuine consultations on all stakeholders will be undertaken by the Commission in the disposition of its tasks to reach at the most inclusive formula.

As the 15-member Transition Commission prepares to draft the Basic Law, which is still subject to the awaited FAB Annexes on power-sharing and wealth-sharing due to be completed by March 2013, PCID hopes that attention will be given to issues concerning the expansion and independence of the Shari’ah legal system. PCID further urges that attention be given to fiscal autonomy and the need to develop policies to establish the foundation for Shari’ah-compliant business and investments to flourish within the Bangsamoro.

As of today, the forces of the Royal Army are engaged in an uneasy standoff with Malaysian security forces: the former insisting on their right to stay, and the latter demanding that the Sultan’s men leave. The Philippine government, through the Department of Foreign Affairs, on one hand, had urged the party of the Sultan to leave peacefully. On the other hand, the Moro National Liberation Front primarily based in the Sulu archipelago and led by Chairman Nur Misuari, has expressed its support of the Sultan’s Sabah claim while calling for a peaceful resolution of the situation. This unanticipated event developed as the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front had signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), facilitated by the Malaysian Government. Significantly, the FAB is seen by critics to have apparently left out the MNLF and again cast aside the Sabah question.

The rising tension over the situation in Lahad Datuh needs to be resolved not just expeditiously but peacefully. It is necessary to ensure that the standoff does not deteriorate into violence. A violent resolution of the Lahad Datu situation will have negative impact on the finalization of the Philippine Government-Moro Islamic Liberation Front peace process.

The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, signed by the Philippine Government and the MILF on October 15, 2012 covers a territory that includes the island provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Basilan. These provinces are part of the domain of the Sultanate of Sulu, which has historical claim over Sabah. Thus, while there is no mention about Sabah in the FAB, there is a Philippine claim over Sabah, which has been brought to the International Court of Justice. Leaders of the island provinces, part of the Sultanate of Sulu, have always maintained that the historical claim to Sabah must be taken into consideration in the peace process.

In this light, the Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID) strongly supports a peaceful and diplomatic resolution to the Sabah standoff between the Royal Army of the Sultanate of Sulu and Malaysian security forces in Lahad Datu, Sabah. The involvement of key players, such as MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari and the Sultan of Sulu will be instrumental in resolving this impasse and arriving at a more inclusive and comprehensive answer. These individuals and the institutions they represent could come together within their ranks and work to generate a peaceful solution to the Sabah conflict. More importantly, both the Philippine and Malaysian governments must ensure that the situation does not escalate into violence. All avenues must be taken to avoid bloodshed. Malaysia must not tarnish its reputation as a peace facilitator and therefore avert the possibility of armed conflict with any Moro entity; same holds true for the Philippines.

The PCID also urges the Aquino administration to reactivate its pursuit of the claim of sovereign rights over Sabah, which it had filed before the International Court of Justice. A just and peaceful resolution of the sovereign claim of the Sulu Sultanate, erstwhile ceded to the Philippine Government, will remove a thorny issue that has caused much uncertainty in the relationship between Malaysia and the Philippines.

Further, the Philippine Government should protect the proprietary rights of Sultan Jamalul Alam’s heirs, identified in the 1939 ruling of Chief Justice C.F.C. Macaskie of the High Court of North Borneo. The heirs were Dayang-Dayang (Princess) Hadji Piandao, who was acknowledged as the major share-holder with 3/8 share; Princess Tarhata Kiram and Princess Sakinur-In Kiram, were to have 3/16th share each; Mora Napsa, Sultan Esmail Kiram, Datu Punjungan, Siiti Mariam, Sitti Jahara and Sitti Rada, who were awarded 1/24th share each.

All the principal heirs have died. The rights of their heirs, most of whom are Filipino citizens, must be protected by the Philippine Government.

The PCID calls on the Philippine Government to create a Sabah Committee, under the Office of the President, to address the Philippine Claim to Sabah. The members of the Committee should include the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Justice, Department of Local Government, Department of National Defense, Mindanao Development Authority, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, a representative of the Sultanate of Sulu as well as a representative of the heirs to Sabah. Past Philippine Administrations have attempted to address the Sabah claim but were unable to reach a lasting and generally acceptable conclusion. However, this must not discourage the stakeholders and peace advocates from pursuing an inclusive, just and sustainable formula that will satisfy the concerns not just of the Philippine and Malaysian Governments but particularly of the Sulu Sultanate and the private heirs to Sabah.

“The Believers are but a single Brotherhood: So make peace and reconciliation between
your two (contending) brothers; and fear Allah, that ye may receive Mercy.”

Surveil

By Amina Rasul

IN ANOTHER David and Goliath move, a hundred armed Tausugs, led by Rajah Mudah (crown prince) Agbimuddin Kiram are in Lahad Datu, Sabah and have captured the attention of the world to the sovereign and proprietary claims of the Sulu sultanate over Sabah. Datu Agbimuddin, the brother of the Sulu sultan, Jamalul Kiram III, has stated that they are in Lahad Datu on a visit of their “homeland.” Since the sultanate is now part of the Philippines, the sovereign rights over Sabah have therefore been assumed by the Philippine government.

Left unresolved, the standoff in Sabah can escalate into an international incident that could create tension between Malaysia and the Philippines. Worse, there may be vested interests that will fuel an escalation into conflict. For instance, how true are the rumors from Malaysia that this incident may be driven by local politicians out to destabilize the ruling party, UMNO, by creating fear among the Sabahans? After all, the Malaysian government, under UMNO leaders, have been fully supporting the peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. News from Malaysia surmise that although Prime Minister Najib Razak is popular, the UMNO may be losing support. If this trend continues, then the opposition led by Datuk Anwar Ibrahim may have a stronger hand in challenging the UMNO in the June elections.

The Moro National Liberation Front, under chairman Nur Misuari, has been meeting in Zamboanga City since Wednesday about the situation. I have been informed that the discussions, which involve Muslim religious leaders from the islands, have leaders demanding support for the followers of the Sultan while calling for a peaceful resolution of the impasse.

With the Philippine government engaged in finalizing the peace agreement with the MILF, supported by the Malaysian government as facilitator, the impasse needs to be resolved peacefully. It is unfortunate that the government, under then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, did not consider the Sabah claim as a major issue that could undermine the effectiveness of Malaysia as facilitator. This, in spite of statements issued by Moro leaders in 2001 that questioned the choice of Malaysia as facilitator amid the Sabah claim.

However, the Malaysian government has been effective in facilitating the GPH-MILF peace process since 2001 as well as an ally for security and development. It is therefore in the interest of all concerned that the Sabah stalemate be quickly and peacefully resolved. This close to the last stage of the peace process, we cannot afford a conflagration that could bring us all back to square 1.

Allow me to provide a background on the Sabah issue so that readers may understand the complexity of the situation. The government has been pursuing its claim over Sabah since the administration of President Diosdado Macapagal. The claim emanates from the Sulu sultanate’s sovereign rights over Sabah, which was turned over to the government. The proprietary claim of the heirs to Sabah, however, originates from the decision of a British court when Malaysia was still under British rule.

THE SULU SULTANATE ACQUIRES SABAH

The Genealogy of the Sulu Royal Families, written by Sururul-AinUtutalum (descendant of Dayang-Dayang Hadja Piandao and, therefore, an heir to Sabah) and Abdul-Karim Hedjazi, traced the close relationship between the royals of Brunei and Sulu. In the 1500s, Brunei Sultan Bolkiah was married to Sulu Princess Putri Laila, granddaughter of Shariful Hashim, first Sultan of Sulu. In the late 1600s, when Sultan Muaddin of Brunei was threatened by rebellion, he turned to his kin in Sulu for help. The rebellion was quelled. As a reward, the Brunei sultan gave resource-rich Sabah to the Sultan of Sulu. The property includes the “mainland of the island of Borneo commencing from the Pandassan River on the north-west coast and extending along the whole east coast as far as the Sibuco River in the south and comprising amongst other the States of Paitan, Sugut, Bangaya, Labuk, Sandakan, Kina Batangan, Mumiang, and all the other territories and states to the southward thereof bordering on Darvel Bay and as far as the Sibuco river with all the islands within three marine leagues of the coast.” The territory is defined in the agreement. (http://www.lawnet.sabah.gov.my/Lawnet/SabahLaws/Treaties/GrantBySultanOfSuluOfTerritoriesAndLandsOnTheMainlandOfTheIslandOfBorneo.pdf.)

SABAH BECOMES PART OF MALAYSIA

In 1763, Sultan Azimuddin signed a treaty allowing the British East Indies Co. to use Sabah and other territories. Tensions later developed between the sultan and the company, which prevented the effective implementation of the treaty until 1878. At this time, Baron Von Overbeck of the British East India Trading Co. entered into a lease agreement or padjak with Sultan Jamalul Alam. This company was later absorbed by the British North Borneo Co. which, in 1946, transferred sovereign rights over Sabah to Britain. When the Federation of Malaya was granted its independence from Britain in 1963, Sabah was one of the territories turned over to the newly established Malaysia.

SOURCE OF DISPUTE

The dispute revolves around the meaning of the term padjak. The Tausug padjak means lease whereas the British version used the term to mean “grant” or “cede.” Thus, the sultan’s heirs maintain that Sabah was merely leased to the company while Malaysia states that the Philippines has no claim because Sabah had been sold to British East India Trading.

The Malaysian government continues to pay lease money owed by British North Borneo to the descendants of the sultan to this day. The Malaysian government pays RM5,300 per year as rental for Sabah to the heirs since the formation of the Malaysian federation in 1963.

Today, the sum of RM5,300 — less than ₱75,000 — as annual rental barely covers the monthly rent of a house in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The heirs, on their own, have attempted to renegotiate the terms of the padjak with the Malaysian government.

In 1996, Princess Denchurai Kiram, daughter of Princess Tarhata Kiram and administrator of her estate, wrote then Prime Minister Mahathir to raise the rental to $1,000,000. She also stated that she and the other heirs were willing to renounce the claim if Kuala Lumpurt will provide a fair settlement. The letter was ignored by Mr. Mahathir.

In June 2010, the Sulu provincial board passed a resolution supporting the demand of the heirs to increase the yearly payment to at least $500 million.

Weeks earlier, Mr. Misuari issued a statement calling the attention of Malaysia to settle the Sabah issue. Misuari’s first wife, the late Desdemona Tan, and present wife Ruayda, are heirs to Sabah since they are descendants of Dayang-Dayang (Queen) HadjaPiandao, who was acknowledged to have 3/8 share of Sabah.

In January 2001, Sultan Esmail Kiram II, the brother of Jamalul III, also wrote Mr. Mahathir, this time through President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Princess Denchurain’s daughter, Princess Tajmahal, was a co-signatory. According to reports, their demand was for $855 million.

SOVEREIGN RIGHTS

The late Ambassador Abraham Rasul, wazir or prime minister to Sultan Esmail Kiram (and later wazir to Sultan Mahakuttah, son of Esmail), had been authorized by the sultan to discuss the pursuit of the Sabah claim with Mr. Macapagal and, later, President Ferdinand Marcos. (Ambassador Rasul succeeded his father, the first Muslim senator, HadjiButu, who was wazir to three sultans.)

Esmail Kiram officially transferred the sultanate’s authority and sovereignty to the Philippines on Sept. 12, 1962 through a written instrument signed by himself and Foreign Affairs Secretary Emmanuel Pelaez. The transfer was authorized by a resolution passed by the RumaBechara (literally “House of Talk,” equivalent to council of advisers/Cabinet). He thus gave up the Sulu sultanate’s sovereign rights to Sabah to the government, but retained proprietary rights over the same.

However, there was a provision in the Ruma Bechara resolution that in the event the government fails or refuses to protect its claim, the Sultanate of Sulu reserves the right to prosecute its claim over Sabah, in whatever manner it can think of. The Kiram family lawyer, Ulka Ulama, and former Senator Santanina Rasul have documents that bear this out. (As a UP political science student, Senator Rasul wrote an award-winning essay on the claim, which was published in the UP Law Journal.)

If the sovereign claim over Sabah is dropped, do we lose all rights? Even if we lose sovereign rights over Sabah, we still have proprietary rights, through the heirs of the Sultan, who personally owned Sabah.

THE HEIRS

The legally recognized owners — members of Sulu royalty and nobility — were identified in the 1939 ruling of Chief Justice C. F. C. Macaskie of the High Court of North Borneo: Dayang-Dayang (Princess) Hadji Piandao was acknowledged as the major share-holder with 3/8 share. Princess Tarhata Kiram and Princess Sakinur-In Kiramwere to each have a 3/16 share. The six other heirs who went to Macaskie’s court were awarded 1/24 share apiece: Mora Napsa, Sultan Esmail Kiram, Datu Punjungan, Sitti Mariam, Sitti Jahara and Sitti Rada.

Princess Denchurain acknowledged the nine heirs specified in the Macaskie decision as the true heirs of Sabah.

All the principal heirs have died. As of today, there are probably a thousand heirs of the heirs. Dayang-Dayang Hadji Piandao Kiram, an only child, was childless. Therefore her cousins, nieces and nephews will divide her 3/8 share. Among her cousins was my grandmother, Hadja Salma, wife of Sen. Hadji Butu. Thus, my father, the late Ambassador Rasul, and his siblings and cousins are heirs. Misuari’s wive (Desdemona and Ruayda), are heirs. Jamalul III and Esmail are the children of Datu Punjungan.

MOVES TO RESOLVE CLAIM

During the term of President Macapagal, the government in 1962 filed a claim over Sabah with the United Nations. A Sabah Division was created in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Marcos had other plans. Parallel to legal maneuverings, he had young Muslims trained in Corregidor to “destabilize” Sabah. The scenario: the Philippines could then come in and take Sabah by force, to “protect” the thousands of Tausugs who lived there or incite them to secede and join the Philippines. The plan went awry, resulting in the massacre of the Muslim trainees. Except for one lone survivor, Jibin Arula. Away from the barracks when he heard gunfire, Arula claimed he saw his comrades mowed down by their military trainors. He ran to the mountains, went over the cliff and into the sea. He was rescued the next day by Cavite fishermen. Somehow, he was brought to then Cavite Gov. Delfin Montano. The governor brought Arula to Senator Benigno Aquino who then exposed the infamous “Jabidah Massacre” of March 18, 1968. Malaysia severed diplomatic ties with the Philippines after the expose. It took the combined efforts of Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand to resolve the situation.

President Corazon C. Aquino wanted to resolve the claim during her term. It seems that Malaysia would only agree to negotiate if all the heirs spoke as one. In 1987, she instructed Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus to bring all the heirs together. On Oct. 23, 1987, Mr. Manglapus wrote Ambassador Rasul: “I would like to suggest that the claimants organize themselves so that they may arrive at a common position…. Although yours is a private claim, we have the assurance of the Malaysian government that they are ready and willing to negotiate with the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu in order to settle this matter.”

Then Sen. Santanina Rasul was requested to coordinate the unification of the heirs. As her chief of staff, I was tasked to implement the assignment. We managed to bring them all to Malacañang. After hours of deliberation, the heirs appointed their representatives, led by Sec. Manglapus, to negotiate with Malaysia. Unfortunately, the meeting came to a standstill when Jamalul III dissented. Afterward, the heirs of Dayang-Dayang Hadji Piandao Kiram, Sultan Esmail Kiram, Princesses Tarhata, Sakinur-in and Sitti Mariam sought a meeting with Sec. Manglapus. A brief from that meeting held on Dec. 6, 1987, stated: “They were of the opinion that Sultan Mohamad Jamalul Kiram III was expressing his own personal views which contravene the consensus reached at the meeting of the heirs with Secretary… Manglapus at the PICC on Friday, December 4 and at the conference of the heirs held with President Corazon C. Aquino at Malacañang on Saturday, December 5.”

President Fidel V. Ramos pursued the attempt to unite the heirs. Upon his suggestion, the representatives of the heirs met on Feb. 10, 1993 to discuss their establishment of the Sulu-Sabah Development Corp., which would be responsible for the economic development and sociocultural advancement of Sulu. It was understood that this entity would be the conduit of the funds from the settlement of the proprietary claim over Sabah. Former Presidential Legal Counsel (now Supreme Court Justice) Antonio Carpio drafted the terms. This corporation would have been powerful if the idea had prospered.

Why then did the attempts fizzle? During the Ramos years, the heirs still could not unite. By then, the idea to establish the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area had prospered. Rich Malaysia was employing hundreds of thousands of Filipinos as well as investing in Mindanao. Terrorism was sprouting and borders had to be secured. The Sabah claim moved to the back burner. This situation continued through the short-lived Estrada presidency.

The Arroyo administration renewed interest in settling the claim. Some of the heirs were feted at Malacañang in 2002 and Jamalul III was hailed as Sultan of Sulu. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo even gave the letter of Sultan Jamalul and Princess Tajmahal, asking for an adjustment of the rentals, to then Prime Minister Mahathir. The Arroyo administration, however, did not unite all the heirs, as the preceding administrations had done.

THE SULTAN OF SULU

The Sultanate of Sulu has had a tradition of being governed by one Sultan, supported and acknowledged by the citizens of the sultanate. The last to be so proclaimed was Sultan Mahakuttah Kiram, the son of Esmail Kiram. Mahakuttah, was recognized by Mr. Marcos, while his father was recognized by Messrs. Macapagal and Marcos. Jamalul III was recognized by Mrs. Arroyo, and was even included in the administration senatorial slate in 2004. He has been the most forceful and visible sultan.

It is unfortunate that today there are over 10 who are claiming the Sultanship. Among them are Sultan Jamalul III and his brother Sultan Esmail. Jamalul is the eldest son of Datu Punjungan Kiram. Initially, Datu Punjungan was the raja muda or crown prince of Sultan Esmail Kiram. But after Datu Punjungan left the Philippines to reside in Sabah, Sultan Esmail was fearful that Datu Punjungan might sign a quitclaim in favor of Malaysia, so he changed his crown prince, with the consent and authority of his Ruma Bechara. Esmail named his eldest son, Mahakuttah Kiram, as his crown prince. When Esmail passed away, Mahakuttah succeeded and his coronation was ordered by Mr. Marcos to safeguard the Sabah claim. Mahakuttah had anointed his son, Muedzul-Lail as the raja muda. At the time, Muedzul-Lail was in grade school.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Sabah impasse needs to be resolved peacefully. It is to the interest of the government to ensure that the MNLF, the dominant Moro liberation front in Sulu, supports a peaceful resolution of the situation. Misuari can play a role to de-escalate tensions. Not only is he Tausug and therefore supportive of the sultanate, his late wife Desdemona and present wife Ruayda are heirs. However, Misuari is aggrieved that the MNLF and he himself have been sidelined in the peace process with the MILF. Further, the Arroyo administration had been instrumental in supporting the Council of 15, which removed Misuari from the leadership of the MNLF. He was also incarcerated for over seven years and later released for lack of evidence. Misuari, who is still recognized by the Organization of the Islamic Conference as the chairman of the MNLF, is therefore a key player. Misuari yesterday convened a meeting of the MNLF and island leaders in Zamboanga City on the situation in Sabah and the claim. A statement will be issued calling for support for the Sabah claim.

• The national government should encourage and assist the leading members of the Kirams and the datus of Sulu to come together and choose one Sultan. This will not only re-establish the tradition of one Sultan leading the Sulu sultanate; it will provide a focal point for the nobility and traditional leaders of Sulu to lead in peace and development. At this point, Sultan Jamalul Kiram III has established his dominance in the field, particularly after the Lahad Datu incident. Most of the leaders in the island-provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Basilan — domain of the Sulu sultanate — have applauded his action.

As many elected leaders in the island-provinces have not been successful in forging a strong foundation of governance and peace, perhaps strengthening the institution of the sultanate will provide Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Basilan with an institution that can help unite the population behind peace and development, as the sultans of Malaysia are doing.

• The Benigno Aquino administration should follow the initiative began by Presidents Corazon Aquino and Ramos to unite the Sabah heirs and pursue the peaceful and just resolution of the Sabah claim.

Surveil
Amina Rasul

THIS YEAR, the Philippine Development Forum (PDF) was held in Davao City on Feb. 4 and 5, a significant move after the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro. The PDF, organized by the national government and its development partners, has a special focus on Mindanao in anticipation of the peace to come. The Mindanao Development Authority, chaired by Secretary Luwalhati “Lu” Antonino, organized the first Mindanao Development Forum on Feb. 1 to provide Mindanao’s leaders an opportunity to come together and present a common agenda to be presented at the PDF.

I was invited to speak at both fora, an opportunity I gladly seized to ensure that the needs of “other Mindanao” were not forgotten. The “other Mindanao” refers to the communities of the Bangsamoro and the Indigenous Peoples, who are often overlooked. Allow me to share with you my reactions to the development plan, from the perspective of Muslim Mindanao.

Sixteen long years after the signing of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the journey to peace has been on a rough and tumultuous path. Allow me to thank the friends and partners of Mindanao who have continued to support us through the years of uncertainty. Finally, under President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, the negotiations between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have yielded the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB). To us, the agreement signed on Oct. 15 last year, is a harbinger of hope. We all await the details of the agreement — on power sharing, revenue and wealth sharing, modalities and the transitional mechanism.

Building on the achievements of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF, the FAB will recreate the existing ARMM to make Muslim Mindanao truly autonomous. A transition commission will draft the basic law that will replace the Autonomy Act (RA 9054), which has been criticized by many Moro leaders as flawed and deliberately designed to make the ARMM fail.

This historic FAB is the closest we have come in 16 years to ensuring lasting and just peace as well as equitable development in Mindanao. However, we at the PCID caution: “The greater challenge is the transition period. It would be make or break for Muslim Mindanao. MILF and all stakeholders of the Bangsamoro must be able to quickly but effectively respond to the new peace and development formation, or risk permanent failure on top of the flawed ARMM experiment.” Some of the concerns:

• Economic sustainability. As the concept of the Bangsamoro political entity is being developed, we need to address the long-overlooked lack of fiscal autonomy of the ARMM. To date, there are no significant businesses and investments, no revenues to be collected. At this point, we must prepare for the establishment of a business and investment climate conducive to the development of an efficient and robust private sector, both formal and informal. Economic growth remains elusive in Muslim Mindanao, the least served region of the Philippines. Instead, the ARMM is one of the three poorest regions, has the highest under-employment rate physical capital, the worst human development indicators. For decades, the dismal security, unstable peace and order conditions in ARMM have driven away private investments and commerce, while providing fertile ground for remunerative criminal activities such as the Aman ponzi scam, kidnap for ransom, drugs and arms dealing, smuggling and human trafficking.

With the FAB, there is now widespread hope that the vicious cycle of conflict and poverty can finally be broken. But it will take time, and will require the Bangsamoro authorities to create an environment that encourages private investment and employment. Without this groundwork, the Aquino “Inclusive Growth” development strategy and opportunities such as the BIMP-EAGA will continue to pass over Muslim Mindanao. But are the Bangsamoro prepared?

• Coordination among government institutions. Since the creation of the autonomous region, governance and delivery of services have been hampered by the unclear relationships among the regional government, national government agencies, and local government units. For instance, the ARMM regional government is supposed to be autonomous but its budget is decided by the national government agencies. Another example: even if the ARMM has the regional agencies under the regional governor, the provincial agencies such as Health are under the local government unit. In preparation for the Bangsamoro new political entity, these relationship issues must be addressed.

• Reforms for a transparent and accountable government. ARMM Regional Governor Mujiv Hataman has taken pride in the reforms initiated by his administration, from implementation of the full disclosure policy to “ghost-busting” of ghost students, ghost teachers and ghost schools.

• Capacity building of the bureaucracy. A major prerequisite for effective governance: we must fast track the capacity building of the leaders and civil servants who are running and who will run the Bangsamoro government. Development partners have cited this lack of capacity, time and again, as a factor hindering delivery of services.

• Education, productivity, and participation. The national government’s priority on school children and youth is truly commendable. The annual budget was increased, strategies and programs for greater access and inclusiveness in education implemented, while convergence initiatives with other agencies were forged to improve access and expand coverage to formal education. Formal education will undoubtedly improve in Muslim Mindanao, but what of over 600,000 adult illiterates in the ARMM? While government and development partners focus on children and youth, there is scant attention afforded adults. Public investment in adult literacy is hardly felt.

In ARMM, the focal point of the FAB, how can these 600,000 plus adult illiterates participate in “Inclusive Growth” and gain employment (outside of low-skilled manual labor) or seize the opportunities or peace dividends to come? If the benefits of the FAB are to be immediately felt by the marginalized Bangsamoro families and communities, shouldn’t there be a specific strategy to provide literacy skills to the over 600,000 adults who cannot read or write? This is a low-hanging fruit with tremendous positive impact.

Further, Muslim women in ARMM are the most vulnerable. The Magbassa Kita Foundation, Inc. is in the third year of implementing its Literacy for Peace and Development (LIPAD) project for adults and will graduate a total of at least 62,500 neo-literates or some 10% of the total adult illiterates of ARMM. The MKFI-LIPAD adult literacy classes showed that 87% of the total illiterate learners enrolled at the barangay level are women. Many of the women learners are beneficiaries of the conditional cash transfer program, which is tied to the performance of children in school. Shouldn’t we invest in literacy program for these mothers so that they can actually help their children do well in school?

Shouldn’t there be a higher investment in adult literacy to increase workers’ productivity and improve industry competitiveness in Muslim Mindanao? Or shall we see migration of literate and skilled labor force into Muslim Mindanao, once peace comes?

Isn’t it important for this significant number of adults — over 600,000 constituents — to be given the skill they need in order to be able to understand the issues — including the complicated issues about the FAB — and participate in governance?

• Greater coverage and better-coordinated social protection programs. The MDF and the PDF highlighted food security and nutrition, protection of vulnerable women and other marginalized groups, among others. However, the reach of government and donors in Muslim Mindanao is still limited, with government and civil society organizations unable to deliver public service to the inaccessible and out of the way areas. How do we achieve this, given the weakness of the present delivery mechanism?

• Improve the delivery system for services. For the past decade, we at the PCID have been recommending an alternative delivery mechanism for services in Muslim Mindanao: tap the Muslim religious leaders. First, the Muslim religious are influential at the community level through the mosque and the madrasah. Second, every Muslim village has a mosque and a madrasah (though most are informal). Thus, it seemed obvious to us that capacitating the religious to serve as community outreach would ensure wider coverage of Muslim Mindanao. We have been developing a community model, centered on the madrasah. We call this Action for Madrasah-Based Advocacy and Learning project or AMAL. Significantly, amal is also an Arabic word that means both “hope” and “action.”

Imagine, if you will, a madrasah teaching mothers about maternal and child health care after teaching children about Islam and Arabic language. Or teaching literacy to parents after the children are taught how to read the Quran. Or holding a discussion about the FAB. This is possible with AMAL.

The AMAL approach will strengthen the resilience of the communities as it provides a “community center” to be part of the implementation of national social development programs. Specifically, it can step in the gap and improve coordination in the implementation of national programs among and across agencies and institutions. It can help enhance governance that will ensure effective delivery of social services. It can also contribute to an effective generation of timely and accurate data that are crucial in the formulation of policies.

The above seven points were my reactions to the government’s development strategy for inclusive growth, particularly for Muslim Mindanao when peace comes. As a parting comment, let me remind: growth is not inclusive, particularly in Muslim Mindanao, if we do not have a strategy for over 600,000 Bangsamoro adults who cannot read, cannot write and are isolated from the larger community. The Philippines has been declared by the World Bank as East Asia’s Rising Tiger. Let not the problems of Muslim Mindanao trip up the Philippines and change the title to East Asia’s Limping Tiger.

- See more at: http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Opinion&title=Inclusive-growth-and-Mindanao&id=65541#sthash.iYk9mzBH.dpuf

January 31, 2013. 2:00-4:00pm

Manila Science High School : “The Peace Process and the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro”

March 13, 2013. 7:00-8:30am

University of the Philippines – College of Social Sciences and Philosophy : “Islamic Feminism in Mindanao”
(Postponed to a later date. To be Announced)

University of Asia and the Pacific : “Philippine Democracy and the 2013 Elections, 27 Years After – ARMM Elections and Local Democracy: Cheating Capital of the Philippines?”
February 28, 2013. 2:00-4:00 pm

Source: ABS-CBN News Online
The women and media engagement was held through the support of the Royal Norwegian Embassy.

Historical Overview of Autonomy in Muslim Mindanao

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao was borne out of the need to solve the decades-long conflict in the southern Philippines. Feeling neglected and oppressed, the Moro National Liberation Front finally transformed frustration and anger into bullets when it rose up in arms against the government in the 1974. The MNLF battle cry was the right to self-determination and an independent “Bangsa Moro” (Moro Nation).

Hoping to quell the insurrection, the Marcos regime signed the Tripoli Agreement in December of 1976 with the MNLF. This provided for a cessation in hostilities and the establishment of autonomy in Mindanao which covered 13 provinces. With this agreement, the original aim of independence was reduced to a quest for autonomy – possession of the right to self-determination but within the framework and territorial integrity of the Philippines.

However, the Marcos government violated the terms of the accord by holding a plebiscite for the provinces and asking them if they would want to be part of the autonomous Mindanao identified in the Tripoli Agreement. This made autonomy conditional instead of automatic. The MNLF thus pulled out of the talks.

The same story unfolded when the government of Aquino once more entered into negotiations with the MNLF. The then-newly promulgated 1987 Constitution, in Section 15 of Article X provided for autonomy in Muslim Mindanao upon the passage of a law. Despite objections of the MNLF to making autonomy conditional on legislative action rather than on the provisions of the existing Tripoli Agreement, government forged ahead with its plans, and Republic Act 6734 otherwise known as the Organic Act of ARMM was passed on August 1, 1989

Following this law, a plebiscite in the 13 provinces identified in the Tripoli Agreement was held on November 19, 1989 to determine which areas would comprise what would be known as the “Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao” or ARMM. Only four of the thirteen provinces – Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi – opted to be part of the ARMM. The MNLF as the representative of the Bangsa Moro was not party to the creation of the Organic Act, nor to the plebiscite. Autonomy was still elusive and the actions that were taken were unilateral on the part of government, an element that undermined the quest for self-determination of Muslim Mindanao.

Thus, while not a full-scale war, the conflict in Mindanao continued after “autonomy” was formally granted in Muslim Mindanao. It was autonomy without the consent and participation of the MNLF, and it was an autonomy that can be characterized as an imposition of the vision of one party – the Philippine government — over the other – the Moros (Filipino Muslims) represented by the MNLF. It was not the autonomy negotiated by both parties in the Tripoli Agreement, and therefore, peace was never won.

When Ramos became president in 1992, he made peace and security a priority and a requisite for development efforts. He specifically made mention of continuing the stalled negotiations with the rebels in Muslim Mindanao. In this vein, he set up institutions that would shepherd the peace process: the National Unification Commission, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Negotiating Panels, the National Amnesty Commission, and the National Program for Unification and Development.

The government once more restarted the peace process with the MNLF, with the negotiations anchored on the principle that what they were discussing was to resolve the non-implementation of the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement. This is supported by the fact that the exploratory talks hosted by Indonesia in 1993 stated that “the talks will focus on the modalities for the full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement in letter and spirit”.

Therefore, when the agreement between the government and the MNLF was finally signed in September of 1996, it was formally called “The Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the Participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference Ministerial Committee of the Six and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference”. (underscoring supplied) The shorthand for the accord is the Final Peace Agreement, of FPA.

But even before the agreement was signed, the government and the MNLF have maintained different perspectives on a key issue. The MNLF has always viewed the Tripoli Agreement and its full implementation as the ultimate reason for talking, and entering into peace. However, the Tripoli Agreement does state that “the Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire agreement” (underscoring supplied).

This statement is the source of the disagreement in the first plebiscite held by Marcos, as well as the subsequent one under Aquino. This is also the reason why the MNLF objected to the provision of the 1987 Constitution that mandated Philippine Congress to define autonomy through legislation. Any law passed by Congress could have superseded the terms of the Tripoli Agreement, and government could justify this violation by pointing to the so-called escape clause built-in by Marcos.

The MNLF claims that the Organic Act and the plebiscite which defined the scope of the ARMM was violative of the Tripoli Agreement, while government claims that it is within the boundaries of the agreement, since the Organic Act and the plebiscite were all actions within the framework of the Philippine Constitution.

In the end, the FPA was still entered into, and we are now into the 15th year of its implementation.

Autonomy in Transition

The implementation of the peace agreement of 1996 envisioned a two-stage implementation in the pursuit of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao: phase one which would be the preparatory phase, and phase two for a full-blown implementation.

The three years (1996 – 1999) of phase one was implemented to give the ARMM the necessary time to develop its institutional and procedural strengths in order to take on the challenges of autonomy, and be ready for phase two. It is critical to analyze phase one because it was the laying of the foundations for the future of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao.

Executive Order No. 371 passed by Ramos in October 2, 1996 (a month after the signing of the FPA) was the first major step in accomplishing the terms of the agreement.

It created the Special Zone for Peace and Development, or SZOPAD. Following the geographic coverage of the Tripoli Agreement, it was created under phase one to be the focus of development efforts. But the original 13 provinces now became 14 due to the creation of the province of Saranggani within the boundaries of the original agreement. The following provinces were part of the SZOPAD:

1. Basilan
2. Davao del Sur
3. Lanao del Norte
4. Lanao del Sur
5. Maguindanao
6. North Cotabato
7. Palawan
8. South Cotabato
9. Saranggani
10. Sulu
11. Sultan Kudarat
12. Tawi-Tawi
13. Zamboanga del Sur
14. Zamboanga del Norte

Nine cities were also under the jurisdiction of the SZOPAD namely: Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Zamboanga, and Puerto Princesa. According to the former ARMM governor and former MNLF Foreign Minister Parouk Hussin, SZOPAD comprised 23% of the Philippines’ land area, around 15% of the total Philippine population, and generated 50% of mineral production in the south, as well as 25% of total aquatic and marine production for the country. (Hussin: 2003)

EO 371 also created the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) along with its Consultative Assembly. The SPCPD was to be the primary implementing mechanism for the development efforts in the SZOPAD, and the 81-member Consultative Assembly was going to act as the advisory body to the SPCPD.

The Consultative assembly was supposed to be comprised by the chair of the SPCPD as head, the governor and vice governor of the ARMM, the 14 provincial governors and 9 city mayors of the SZOPAD, 44 members of the MNLF, and 11 sectoral representatives nominated by civil society. (May: 2002)

But at the outset, this arrangement was criticized. The question of whether these transitional bodies (SZOPAD, SPCPC, and the Consultative Assembly) could have truly begun the process towards self-determination was raised. Due to objections from national and local politicians (most of whom were not involved in the peace process), the provisions of the executive order were diluted thus:

“Among other things, the provision in the agreement for forty-four MNLF members in the Consultative Assembly was dropped, and the provisions of the agreement which placed specified government agencies under the control and/or supervision of the SPCPD were deleted. In fact, the SPCPD was given little scope for policy action except through the Office of the President.” (May: 2002)

Hence, contrary to what was agreed upon, the three institutions (SZOPAD, SPCPD, and the Consultative Assembly) did not possess significant autonomy. They derived their powers from the Office of the President. The same is true for the Regional Executive Council of ARMM and the ARMM Regional Governor, who according to the Organic Act “dispenses with his power and authority on behalf of the President, who exercises overall supervision on regional and local government affairs”. Accordingly, these regional institutions became mere “appendages of the Executive Office” (Bauzon: 1999).

It is interesting to note that the ARMM is treated like any other local government unit, as manifested in the provisions of the Organic Act. If the powers of the Autonomous Region is derived from and supervised by the central government, then can it be correctly called autonomous?

The creation of the SPCPD was aimed at coordinating development efforts in SZOPAD, in order to lay the foundations of autonomy in Mindanao. But the opposite seems to have happened. According to the former Majority Leader of the Consultative Assembly, Eliseo Mercado, the failure of the transition to autonomy could be attributed to the fact that the SPCPD as the primary mechanism for development did not have clear and delineated roles and relationships with the existing governance structures in the region. (Bacani: 2004)

There was no clear understanding as to how the SPCPD and the CA could spur development in SZOPAD because it did not possess any internal powers and what it did possess was not clearly identified. There was no meaningful linkage between the SPCPD and other regional mechanisms such as the regional development councils and regional peace and order councils. Its relationships to the existing local government units were also not spelled out (Mercado: 2006; Bacani: 2004)

Instead of fostering development, the SPCPD, SZOPAD, and the Assembly became just another layer in the bureaucracy. Just to underscore the weakness of these transitory structures, it was commented that they

“… were too powerless to make an impact. They had very limited funding, no police powers, no control over national projects and programmes that were supposed to be within their remit, and no jurisdiction over significant sections of the bureaucracy in the region” (Gutierrez 1999 as cited in May: 2000).

Adding to this, the Philippine President also has a very central role in how the ARMM functions. In fact, the election of the ARMM Regional Governor is said to be heavily influenced by the central government, such that “the governor of ARMM is generally viewed as having his principal loyalty to Manila rather than the local population.” (World Bank: 2005) Beyond these elections, the ARMM Governor still falls under the supervision of the Office of the President, just like any other head of a local government unit.

Under President Estrada’s administration, this problem on the transitory structures was magnified when he issued Executive Order 261 in July of 2000. This created the Mindanao Coordinating Council, which was authorized to coordinate all development and infrastructure programs in Mindanao. This Council in effect took over SPCPD’s role in coordinating development efforts in the SZOPAD.

In protest over this marginalization of the SPCPD, three prominent officials of the SPCPD and Consultative Assembly resigned, namely: Notre Dame University President Fr. Eliseo Mercado as Majority Floor leader of the SPCPD-Consultative Assembly, Mayor Edward Hagedorn of Puerto Princesa as SPCPD Vice Chairman and Bai Yasmin Macalandong as member of the Consultative Assembly.

Notwithstanding the problems in the initial steps (Phase I) in pursuing autonomy in Muslim Mindanao, the government as stipulated in the 1996 Peace Agreement proceeded to Phase II.

This stage was supposed to be the realization of full autonomy. A law was to be passed that would amend the old Organic Act of ARMM (RA 6734 passed in 1989) and would redefine the Autonomous Region two years after the beginning of phase I (in 1998). It would also establish an Executive Council, a Legislative Assembly, an administrative system, a system of representation in the national government, a regional security force, an educational system, and an economic and financial system

After a delay of three years, the Philippine Congress passed the amendatory law called Republic Act 9054, or the ARMM’s New Organic Act in 2001. This law is formally known as “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the ARMM, Amending for the Purpose RA No. 6734, Entitled ‘An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao’, As Amended”.

Following the law’s provisions, a plebiscite was held on August 14, 2001 This referendum on the expansion of ARMM was objected to by the MNLF. Not unexpectedly, out of the current 15 provinces and nine cities in SZOPAD, only Basilan province and the Islamic City of Marawi joined the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi to form the new ARMM.

The nature of this autonomy has been termed “paradoxical”, because as the ARMM was given a special character drawn from new laws, rules and procedures that did not exist in other local governments – purportedly to effect autonomy in the area – these new conditions have become in effect an “unwelcome encumbrance” for ARMM. (Bauzon: 1999) Perhaps more telling is the fact that consistently, the MNLF has objected to the terms of any new law that purports to enhance or deepen autonomy in the area.
These “encumbrances” are manifested in how the transitional bodies have not worked due to the lack of coordination and basic understanding of what they do. This is exacerbated by the electoral process for the ARMM regional governor, which is still heavily influenced by central government.

One major issue which has affected how autonomy has functioned within the context of this “new ARMM” is the regional government’s administrative capacity – its technical capabilities, its human resources, and most importantly, its financial resources. But this capacity in turn is mediated by many factors, most important of which is the relationship of the ARMM regional government to national government and its agencies operating within the area. According to the World Bank Joint Needs Assessment for Mindanao (2005) “the multiplicity of institutions involved and their lines of reporting and authority also complicate governance in …Mindanao.” This overlapping of functions and lack of clarity in jurisdictional boundaries has created more problems for the achievement of autonomy.

The Administrative Capacity of the ARMM Regional Government

ARMM is the only autonomous region in the Philippines, and hence has the only regional government in the Philippines. The other 15 regions in the country are purely administrative areas for deconcentration purposes only, and they have no political powers and no elective positions. ARMM has an executive branch with an elected regional governor and vice-governor, a Regional Legislative Assembly with 21 elected members as its legislature, and a judicial system for personal laws in Islam, or the Shari’ah courts.

According to the World Bank Joint Needs Assessment Report (2005), 20 national government agencies have already been devolved to ARMM, on paper. This means that the ARMM Regional Government (ARMM-RG) has the primary responsibility of implementing the functions of these offices, as turned-over by national government. These are:

1. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
2. Office of Southern Cultural Communities
3. Department of Agrarian Reform
4. Department of Agriculture
5. Department of Education
6. Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
7. Department of Science and Technology
8. Commission on Higher Education
9. Department of Environment and Natural Resources
10. Department of Health
11. Department of Interior and Local Government
12. Department of Tourism
13. Department of Trade and Industry
14. Regional Board of Investments
15. Department of Labor and Employment
16. Department of Public Works and Highways
17. Department of Social Welfare and Development
18. Cooperative Development Authority
19. Regional Tripartite and Wage Productivity Board
20. Regional Ports and Management Authority

There are also eight undevolved agencies but with field offices in the ARMM, and nine regionally-created offices (Gomez: 2003)

But according to the World Bank assessment, only three agencies have been performing their functions in an autonomous manner. These three are the Interior and Local Government (with the exception of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and the Bureau of Fire Protection, whose functions continue to be centrally-supervised), Social Welfare and Development, and Trade and Industry.

Even within devolved agencies, certain functions and responsibilities remain with the national government. For the new members of the ARMM (Basilan province and Marawi City), the national agencies that were supposed to be devolved continue to get their funding from the regions they used to be part of.

What is happening then is autonomy on paper, rather than autonomy in fact, as regards the nature of the bureaucracy of the ARMM-RG. If the key governance mechanism is still dependent on national government, is it reasonable to claim the ARMM is autonomous?

Inter-Governmental Relations in ARMM

There is an even bigger problem as regards the relationship between the local governments within the ARMM, and the ARMM-RG, as well as their relationships to the national government. The local governments are central to development initiatives, and as ARMM has been given autonomy, it then theoretically has control over its local government units. After all, it should now be the coordinator of development efforts in the region.

The ARMM Legislative Assembly as part of its mandate is supposed to enact a regional Local Government Code to further define and enhance autonomy. They did so in 1993. But accordingly, these founding laws (Organic Act and ARMM Local Government Code) are not well-understood by officials or citizens, and they are not fully implemented. (Asian Development Bank, 2002)

The regional local government code has not been updated to reflect the new organic act (RA 9054) nor is it widely implemented. The LGUs within ARMM still use the 1991 National LGC as their basis. (Asian Development Bank, 2002)

This overlapping of provisions – that of the Organic Act and the National Local Government Code — has complicated the relationship between the ARMM-RG and its component local government units. Accordingly, “ownership of assets and the level of devolution of authority and powers also vary significantly resulting in complication and confusion not only among end-users but officials as well.” (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005) The end result of this confusion is the blurring of the accountability mechanisms – which institution is to supposed to do what, and who will be held accountable for the failure for service delivery and policy implementation?

This is exacerbated by the fact that the regional government of ARMM is treated just like any other local government unit. A comparison of RA 6734 and RA 7160 (Local Government Code of the Philippines) shows that non-ARMM LUG’s are treated on an almost equal footing as the ARMM-RG in terms of expenditure assignment although the functions and responsibilities assigned to the regional government of ARMM are slightly broader than those given to non-ARMM LGUs. For example, the ARMM Regional Government is charged with the provision of agrarian reform and education services, the promotion of employment and workers’ welfare, and the promotion of trade and industry while non-ARMM LGUs are not. (Asian Development Bank and World Bank – Joint Document, 2005)

Because the expenditure assignments for the ARMM-RG and non-ARMM local government units are the same, what tasks are left for the local government units within ARMM? The Regional Government has not devolved any of its functions to the LGUs within their jurisdiction even if they could under Organic Act. Thus, ARMM-LGUs do not need to perform devolved functions already given to non-ARMM LGUs under the LGC (Asian Development Bank and World Bank – Joint Document, 2005)

This has led the Asian Development Bank (2002) to conclude that
service delivery responsibilities have not been fully devolved. Furthermore, the coordination and linkages between ARMM agencies, their national counterparts and local government units within the ARMM are weak, hindering the effectiveness and efficiency of policy implementation. (Asian Development Bank, 2002)

This results in a wait-and-see attitude among those responsible for service delivery. If both the ARMM-RG and the ARMM LGU’s are tasked to deliver a service, and both expect the other to do so, the net effect is that nothing gets accomplished. Aside from this confusion and overlapping of mandates, there is also the question of the capacity of the people who man the ARMM-RG bureaucracy.

Human Resource Deployment

There has been a steady stream of criticisms levied against the ARMM Regional Government. According to the Asian Development Bank (2002), ARMM is plagued by “inefficient systems and procedures in human resource management, insufficient focus on performance, and a tendency of appointments to be politically-influenced. Regional agencies have limited skills and experience, which limits ability to absorb overseas development assistance.”

This weakness is human resource technical capacity has led to the incomplete implementation of the policies and laws that govern the operations of the autonomous region. This weakness is widespread, starting with the officials of the regional government and their staff, and includes the members of the legislative assembly. This latter group is particularly significant since they are tasked with crafting enabling legislation to further operationalize the different laws in ARMM. (Asian Development Bank, 2002)

There is also the constant refrain that the ARMM regional government is overstaffed. Is this true? If so, what could explain the disproportionately high personnel costs? The chart below shows the distribution of the ARMM-RG budgetary pie.

Source: Legislative Budget and Research Management Office, Philippine Senate

From 1997 to 2006, the average share of personal services – salaries and wages of the bureaucracy — has been around 70%. Operating costs only account for 16%, and capital outlays at 14%. As mentioned above, the ARMM regional government had to absorb the personnel of 20 devolved line agencies, as well as establish a regional governor’s office, and a regional legislative assembly. This has contributed to the large overhead on personal services.
Aside from that, according to the World Bank, teachers comprise more than 74% of the ARMM-RG workforce. This is followed by ARMM-Department of Health which accounts for 7.5%. This means that more than 80% of civil servants who draw salaries in the ARMM regional government are involved in the basic services of education and health. These are population-sensitive work: the more the population grows, the more you have to hire teachers, doctors, or nurses.

As a matter of fact, the Japanese aid agency JICA claims that the personnel from the devolved agencies are not enough to provide for basic services in the entire region. Therefore, ARMM has to hire more people despite the fact that around 70% of its budget already goes to salaries.

The ARMM Regional Government then seems to be in a double-bind. It lacks the human resource capabilities and institutional strength to run the now-devolved agencies. But at the same time, the devolved agencies are still pretty much oriented towards Manila, and taking orders from their respective central offices.

Funding Autonomy

The nature and state of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao is affected by the extent to which the regional government possesses the resources that will make autonomy a viable proposition. While autonomy means that ARMM is now responsible for generating its resources, it is also undeniable that as the poorest region in the country and the site of continued conflicts, it needs more than just status-quo funding.

What is needed is massive infusion of resources to bring the region at least at par with the other non-autonomous regions before it is left to its own devices. Pump-priming activities are essential to jump-start economic development. Only then can the fiscal position of ARMM be strong enough for it to stand on its own two feet.

A World Bank study in 2005 identifies two unique features which characterize the new mandates for the ARMM regional government:

 Public services already being performed by local government units in other parts of the country are still being performed by the ARMM regional government.
 Other services not yet devolved to local government units elsewhere are already being performed by the ARMM regional government (such as education). (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005)

Thus, ARMM has to fund the cost of a regional governor and a legislative assembly. These items also do not exist in other regions. Aside from that, regional line departments already devolved to ARMM (e.g. ARMM-Department of Education) have a bigger workload than the usual regional administrative offices of national agencies (e.g. Department of Education Region IV office).
A paradox is created because of this. Because of the confusion arising from the mandates of the regional government and the local government code, the local government units within ARMM have been given more resources at their disposal, but they have less responsibilities because what other LGU’s are already doing is assigned to the ARMM Regional Government.

It is not surprising that the study concludes “ARMM costs tend to be higher than those in other regions”. Given all these, when compared with other regions, ARMM’s share does not seem commensurate to what it has to fund, as can be seen in the table below.

Comparative Share in Government’s Expenditure (In billion pesos)
NCR, CAR, and Mindanao Regions
Source: Congressional Planning and Budget Department, House of Representatives

It seems as if ARMM did not receive the pump-priming treatment that was deemed to be so crucial in jump-starting development in the conflict-ridden area. Despite all the additional mandates brought about by devolution and the Organic Act and as discussed above, there is apparently no massive infusion of funds necessary to take care of all the extra mandates that it received. It receives almost the same share as any other region in Mindanao, belying the talk of “pump-priming” and “mini Marshall Plans” for the ARMM.

Given this funding situation, it is not surprising that there are many criticisms about the nature of this autonomy. Without the financial wherewithal, can ARMM be truly autonomous?

Who Controls the Funds?

Aside from the amounts that the ARMM-RG has at its disposal, what is even more crucial is the extent of control over whatever funding is available. According to the Asian Development Bank (2002), ARMM-RG receives around 97% of budget from the national government. This fact alone belies any claims to autonomy, fiscal or otherwise. It is highly unlikely that the ARMM-RG can effect policies on its own, given that it has to seek approval of its budget from national government – just like any other line agency. In fact, other local government units (provinces, cities, municipalities that are not part of ARMM) seem to be in a better position since a certain portion of their funding is released automatically.

The dependence of ARMM on national government for its funds is underscored by the fact that the ability of ARMM-LGUs to generate other sources of income and to attract investments is “limited by security concerns, low economic development, and weak institutional systems.” Furthermore, the enacted local revenue code is not fully implemented. (Asian Development Bank, 2002)

The findings of an INCITEGOV study (2007), as well as the World Bank Joint Social Assessment (2005) publication on the amount of control exercised by the ARMM regional government on their budgets are very revealing. According to the two studies, the ARMM budget is still controlled by national government with 95.2% of the regional budget marked as controlled by national government. The ARMM budget as previously mentioned has to be defended in Congress just like any other regular department.

INCITEGOV states that “only a negligible 4% (of ARMM funds)…is completely within the control of (ARMM regional government).” The World Bank report concludes that “the ARMM has no more real or practical autonomy in deciding on the level and allocation of funds intended for its politically distinct mandate than other non-autonomous administrative agencies of national government”.

If the ARMM Regional Government has limited resources at its disposal, cannot generate its own resources, and whatever resources it has is not within its control, how do we analyze and evaluate the nature of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao? The only possible answer is this: there is no meaningful and true self-determination for the Muslims, despite all pronouncements to the contrary. It is no wonder then that so many stakeholders in the peace and development efforts are frustrated at the current state of Muslim Mindanao.

The Implementation of Shari’ah

One of the primary components of the autonomy in ARMM is the degree to which Muslim personal laws – the Shari’ah – are being implemented. Muslim Mindanao will thus have its own legal system over disputes that concern family matters, communal property and other personal matters. (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005) This emphasizes the unique nature of Muslim society from the Philippines.

The Shari’ah courts are organized into two: the District Courts which preside over matters of inheritance, custody and guardianship, and the Circuit Courts which preside over marriage or divorce. The amended Organic Act (RA 9054) also provides for the creation of the Shari’ah Appellate Court, which is composed of one presiding justice and two associate justices. (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005)

But from its inception as provided for in the peace agreement, the implementation of Shari’ah was already problematic. There was only 1 paragraph (Article 152) devoted to the Shari’ah system. There were inadequate specifications how the Muslim personal laws would relate to national laws. Further, there were also no provisions on adapting existing Muslim laws to the current situation of Muslims in Mindanao. (Bauzon, 1999)

Aside from this lack of context and operationalization, the implementation of Muslim laws also faced significant problems by severe lack of court officials. As of December 21, 2002 there were five Shari’ah district courts and 51 circuit courts. But of these, only one out of the five district courts were filled, and only 32 of the 51 circuit courts had judges. (Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 2004)

Furthermore, the Appellate Court is yet to be organized, almost a decade after the peace agreement was signed. The courts were also said to have limited geographical coverage, and with a large number of vacancies. (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005)

In the end, the full implementation of Shari’ah is affected by multiple factors that hamper autonomy, as regards the legal aspect. According to the Joints Need Assessment of the World Bank:

“The institutional capacity of the Shari’ah Courts is weak. There is severe lack of physical infrastructure. Deficient court technology, equipment and inadequate budget outlays plague the Shari’ah Courts.” (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005)

Conclusion

It seems clear then that whatever gains have been made by the signing of the peace agreement in 1996, the subsequent creation of transition mechanisms, and the passage of a new Organic Act to govern Muslim Mindanao, the end-result is something that is surely not what was agreed upon.

What obtains in ARMM today is something that does not even come close to autonomy. “To be autonomous is to be one’s own person, to be directed by considerations, desires, conditions and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s authentic self”. (Christman, 2003)
ARMM does not have control over its resources. It does not have the legal system to address the unique characteristics and requirements of Muslims despite being promised one. It does not even have the capacity – human, technical, bureaucratic — to develop on its own. How can the ARMM – whether through its Regional Government, its local government units, or as a people – pursue its own desires and considerations?

Since 1989, we have been calling this region in Mindanao autonomous, and yet, looking at the many studies and analyses done on the critical factors that determine autonomy, it is apparent that this autonomy is, at best, a misnomer. At worst, it is a farcical palliative to defuse further conflicts that may arise if the Muslims realize that what they have been clamoring for has merely been a pipe dream.

Autonomy is not the solution to the peace and development problems of Muslim Mindanao. It is, in fact, the precondition for any lasting, meaningful and sustainable peace. Therefore it is essential that all stakeholders – government, MNLF, MILF, civil society, the international community – acknowledge that the assumption is wrong. We cannot advance answers to the so-called “Mindanao problem” if we keep on asking the wrong questions, and if we have preconceived notions of what should be there, but actually is not.

Thus, we have to redefine the issue of Muslim Mindanao. We have to question autonomy.

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